Re: heads up - NetApp, NFSv4, and UDP

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From: Trond Myklebust (trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no)
Date: 11/26/02-11:05:49 AM Z 

Message-ID: <15843.43501.600410.732252@charged.uio.no>
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2002 18:05:49 +0100
Subject: Re: heads up - NetApp, NFSv4, and UDP
From: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>

>>>>> " " == RJ Atkinson <rja@extremenetworks.com> writes:

     > 	If someone modifying your TCP/IP stack is really your threat
     > 	model,
     > then you probably should not use NFS at all, because there are
     > N other serious security problems that (timeout + retry) cannot
     > fix.

That's why we've added data integrity + data privacy into the security
model.
However those apply at the RPC level, *not* at the TCP level. People
can spoof ACKs back to the client, but they're not supposed to be able
to spoof RPC requests or replies.

     > 	It would only get dropped iff it failed authentication.
     > It would only fail authentication if one sent an invalid
     > request.  Resending an invalid request won't make it magically
     > valid.

No. AFAICS it would get dropped iff it violates of the sequence number
window. If so, then breaking the connection, and renegotiating a
context *will* magically make the request valid.

Cheers,
  Trond

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