MORE INFORMATION
The management of interdomain trust accounts ("permitted to trust this
domain") is be addressed by this article. For information about managing
the "permitted to trust this domain" side of the domain trust relationship.
You can manage trusted domains and associated passwords programmatically by
using the Windows NT LSA (local security authority) API. Use the Net
function call to obtain information necessary to manage trusted domains.
Considerations for Managing Trusted Domains
- Trusted domain updates must take place on the primary domain controller
for the target domain.
- The trusted domain name should be all uppercase for consistency with
Windows NT account management utilities.
- The maximum domain name length is MAX_COMPUTERNAME_LENGTH (15).
- The maximum trusted domain password length is LM20_PWLEN (14).
- The password provided at trust-creation time is valid only until the
trust has become active on the domain. A new password is established
during trust relationship activation.
- The user who calls the LSA trust management functions must have
Administrator privilege on the target domain.
- The Windows NT LSA API and Net function calls are currently
implemented as Unicode only. The caller must ensure that strings
passed to these functions are in Unicode form.
- LsaSetTrustedDomainInformation does not verify the validity or
existence of the supplied domain Sid. The caller of these API is
responsible for ensuring that a valid Sid is provided to the API.
You can use NetUserModalsGet at info level 2 against the domain
controller for the trusted domain for this purpose.
- Do not set TrustedPosixOffsetInformation info level with
LsaSetTrustedDomainInformation(). This information is managed by
the LSA, so it should not be set.
- Do not set a domain to trust itself; the trusted domain name should
not match the domain name where the policy update takes place.
List of APIs That Can Be Used to Manage Trusted Domains
NetGetDCName can be used to obtain the computer name of the primary domain
controller associated with a domain name.
NetUserModalsGet at info level 2 can be used to obtain the Sid representing
the trusted domain, in addition to the domain name of the specified
computer. The target machine is a domain controller for the trusted domain.
The resultant domain Sid is supplied to LSA API calls that require the
Domain Sid of the trusted domain to manage.
NetServerGetInfo at info level 101 can be used to determine if the target
of the policy object update is a domain controller or a workstation. This
article does not address the workstation case, so this determination is
necessary.
NetApiBufferFree is used to free buffers allocated by Net function calls
that return information.
LsaOpenPolicy is used to open the policy object on the computer where the
trusted domain update is taking place. The target computer is a primary
domain controller.
LsaDeleteTrustedDomain is used to delete a trusted domain.
LsaQueryTrustedDomainInfo at info level TrustedPasswordInformation is used
to determine if the trusted domain object already exists, and if so, what
the current Password is.
LsaSetTrustedDomainInformation at info level TrustedDomainNameInformation
is used to create the trusted domain object if the object does not yet
exist.
LsaSetTrustedDomainInformation at info level TrustedPasswordInformation is
used to set the new password associated with the trusted domain object. If
the specified trust existed after the call to LsaQueryTrustedDomainInfo,
set the OldPassword on the trusted domain object to the previous password
obtained from the Query operation.
LsaFreeMemory should be used if memory was allocated by the LSA for the
caller. An example of this is data provided by LsaQueryTrustedDomainInfo.
LsaCloseHandle is used to close an open policy handle when it is no longer
needed.
Steps to Verify That the Trust Exists
Prior to creating a new trusted domain, it may be useful to verify that the
"permitted to trust this domain" side of the trust relationship exists and
is consistent with the new trusted domain. If the trust does not exist or
is inconsistent, the user could be alerted to take action in order to
complete the trust relationship.
The trust can be verified by attempting to establish a connection to the
trusted domain and specifying a username, domain name, and password
corresponding to the trust account and trusted domain password.
The following steps should be used to verify the trust:
- Obtain the domain controller computer name for the trusted domain by
calling NetGetDCName(). This domain name is also used as the domain name
associated with the trust account.
- Build a UNC path containing the trusted domain computer name and the
Interprocess communication share. An example UNC path is:
- Build a user name consisting of the domain name, which is "permitted
to trust," with a "$" appended. An example user name is:
- Call NetUseAdd() at info level 2 to specify the domain name, UNC path,
user name, and password associated with the trust.
If the trust is successfully verified, the connection attempt fails with
ERROR_NOLOGON_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT. In this case, the supplied
credentials were validated, but the account type does not allow a network
style logon.
If NetUseAdd succeeds with NERR_Success, the specified trust account does
not exist, because the specified account does not exist on the target
computer, and default credentials were used to establish the connection.
Use NetUseDel to delete the connection.
If NetUseAdd fails with ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE, the supplied password does not
match the password on the trust account.
If NetUseAdd fails with ERROR_SESSION_CREDENTIAL_CONFLICT, a connection
already exists to the specified domain controller, which uses credentials
that differ from the credentials supplied with NetUseAdd. The existing
connection must be deleted to verify the trust.
NOTE: This method of trust verification is advisory and may be specific to
versions of Windows NT versions 3.1 through 4.0.
Sample Code
/*++
This sample illustrates how to manage Windows NT trusted domains at the
domain controller level.
The first command line argument indicates the name of the new or
existing trusted domain to create or modify.
The second command line argument indicates the new password for the
trusted domain specified in the first argument.
The optional third argument indicates the domain name that is the
target of the trusted domain update operation. If this argument is not
specified, the update will occur on the local domain. Note that this
sample will not allow a trusted domain update to occur on a non-domain
controller.
This sample requires header files found on the Windows NT 3.51 SDK
CD-ROM compact disc in the \Mstools\Security directory.
This sample works correctly compiled ANSI or Unicode. Note that Net
function calls are Unicode only, and Windows NT LSA API are Unicode
only.
The following import libraries are required:
Netapi32.lib
Advapi32.lib
--*/
#ifndef UNICODE
#define UNICODE
#define _UNICODE
#endif
#include <windows.h>
#include <lm.h> // for NetXxx API
#include "ntsecapi.h"
// \mstools\samples\win32\winnt\security\include\ntsecapi.h
#include <stdio.h>
#define RTN_OK 0
#define RTN_USAGE 1
#define RTN_ERROR 13
//
// if you have the DDK, include Ntstatus.h
//
#ifndef STATUS_SUCCESS
#define STATUS_SUCCESS ((NTSTATUS)0x00000000L)
#define STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000034L)
#define STATUS_INVALID_SID ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000078L)
#endif
void
InitLsaString(
PLSA_UNICODE_STRING LsaString,
LPWSTR String
);
NTSTATUS
OpenPolicy(
LPWSTR ServerName,
DWORD DesiredAccess,
PLSA_HANDLE PolicyHandle
);
BOOL
GetDomainSid(
LPWSTR DomainName, // domain name to acquire Sid of
PSID *pDomainSid // points to allocated Sid on success
);
NTSTATUS
SetTrustedDomainInfo(
LSA_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
PSID DomainSid, // Sid of domain to manipulate
LPWSTR TrustedDomainName, // trusted domain name to add/update
LPWSTR Password // new trust password for trusted domain
);
BOOL
VerifyTrustRelationship(
LPWSTR TargetDomainName, // domain name to verify trust at
LPWSTR TrustAccountToVerify, // trusted domain name to verify
LPWSTR Password, // password associated with trust
LPBOOL bTrustVerified // indicates if trust was verified
);
void
DisplayNtStatus(
LPSTR szAPI, // ANSI string containing API name
NTSTATUS Status
);
void
DisplayError(
LPSTR szAPI, // pointer to failed API name
DWORD dwLastError
);
//
// Unicode entry point and argv
//
int
__cdecl
wmain(
int argc,
wchar_t *argv[]
)
{
BOOL bAllocTargetDomain; // did you allocate memory for target?
LSA_HANDLE PolicyHandle;
LPWSTR TargetDomainName; // target domain of policy update
LPWSTR DomainController; // computer name where policy update
PSID DomainSid; // allocated Sid representing domain to trust
LPWSTR TrustedDomainName;
LPWSTR Password;
BOOL bTrustVerified;
NET_API_STATUS nas;
NTSTATUS Status;
if(argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Usage: %ls <NewTrustedDomain> <Password> [TargetDomain]\n",
argv[0]);
return RTN_USAGE;
}
TrustedDomainName = argv[1]; // existing or new TrustedDomain
Password = argv[2]; // new password for TrustedDomain
//
// if a TargetDomain was specified, point to that.
// if not, set TargetDomain to the current domain if a DC.
//
if(argc == 4 && *argv[3] != L'\0') {
TargetDomainName = argv[3]; // domain to update trust at
bAllocTargetDomain = FALSE; // no memory allocated
}
else {
PSERVER_INFO_101 si101;
DWORD Type;
PUSER_MODALS_INFO_2 umi2;
//
// ensure that the local computer is a DC. This operation is
// only appropriate against a domain controller.
//
nas = NetServerGetInfo(NULL, 101, (LPBYTE *)&si101);
if(nas != NERR_Success) {
DisplayError("NetServerGetInfo", nas);
return RTN_ERROR;
}
Type = si101->sv101_type;
NetApiBufferFree(si101);
if( !(Type & SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_CTRL) &&
!(Type & SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_BAKCTRL) ) {
printf("Error: Specify a TargetDomain; this operation"
" is only valid against a domain.\n");
return RTN_ERROR;
}
//
// obtain the local computer's domain name
//
nas = NetUserModalsGet(NULL, 2, (LPBYTE *)&umi2);
if(nas != NERR_Success) {
DisplayError("NetUserModalsGet", nas);
return RTN_ERROR;
}
//
// copy the domain name to new storage
//
TargetDomainName = (LPWSTR)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0,
(lstrlenW(umi2->usrmod2_domain_name) + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR));
if(TargetDomainName != NULL) {
lstrcpyW(TargetDomainName, umi2->usrmod2_domain_name);
bAllocTargetDomain = TRUE; // we allocated memory
}
NetApiBufferFree(umi2); // free memory allocated by NetXxx
//
// if an error occurred allocating memory, exit
//
if(TargetDomainName == NULL) {
DisplayError("HeapAlloc", 0);
return RTN_ERROR;
}
}
//
// do not allow a Domain to trust itself
//
if(lstrcmpiW(TargetDomainName, TrustedDomainName) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr,"Error: Domain %ls cannot trust itself.\n",
TargetDomainName);
return RTN_ERROR;
}
//
// ensure Password and TrustedDomainName are the correct length
//
if(lstrlenW(Password) > LM20_PWLEN)
Password[LM20_PWLEN] = L'\0'; // truncate
if(lstrlenW(TrustedDomainName) > MAX_COMPUTERNAME_LENGTH)
TrustedDomainName[MAX_COMPUTERNAME_LENGTH] = L'\0'; // truncate
//
// obtain the primary DC computer name from the specified
// TargetDomainName
//
nas = NetGetDCName(
NULL, TargetDomainName, (LPBYTE *)&DomainController);
if(nas != NERR_Success) {
DisplayError("NetGetDCName", nas);
return RTN_ERROR;
}
//
// verify the trust relationship
//
if(!VerifyTrustRelationship(
TrustedDomainName,
TargetDomainName, // trust account to verify
Password,
&bTrustVerified
)) {
//
// an error occurred during trust relationship verification
//
DisplayError("VerifyTrustRelationship", GetLastError());
}
else {
//
// inform the user if the trust was not verified
//
if(!bTrustVerified) {
DWORD dwTrustVerifyFailReason = GetLastError();
//
// You could exit here, but this is optional. Reasons for
// trust verification failure could be non-existent
// "permitted to trust" on the verified domain (rc=1317),
// wrong password (rc=1326), etc
//
printf("Warning: ");
switch(dwTrustVerifyFailReason) {
case ERROR_NO_SUCH_USER:
printf("%ls not permitted-to-trust on %ls\n",
TargetDomainName, TrustedDomainName);
break;
case ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE:
printf("Trust %ls has incorrect password on %ls\n",
TrustedDomainName, TargetDomainName);
break;
default:
DisplayError("Trust was not verified. Non-fatal",
dwTrustVerifyFailReason);
} // switch
}
}
//
// fetch the DomainSid of the domain to trust
//
if(!GetDomainSid(TrustedDomainName, &DomainSid)) {
DisplayError("GetDomainSid", GetLastError());
return RTN_ERROR;
}
//
// open the policy on the target domain
//
Status = OpenPolicy(
DomainController,
POLICY_CREATE_SECRET | // for password set operation
POLICY_TRUST_ADMIN, // for trust creation
&PolicyHandle
);
if(Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
DisplayNtStatus("OpenPolicy", Status);
return RTN_ERROR;
}
//
// Update TrustedDomainInfo to reflect the specified trust.
//
Status = SetTrustedDomainInfo(
PolicyHandle,
DomainSid,
TrustedDomainName,
Password
);
if(Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
DisplayNtStatus("SetTrustedDomainInfo", Status);
return RTN_ERROR;
}
//
// if you allocated memory for TargetDomainName, free it
//
if(bAllocTargetDomain)
HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, TargetDomainName);
//
// free the Sid which was allocated for the TrustedDomain Sid
//
FreeSid(DomainSid);
//
// close the policy handle
//
LsaClose(PolicyHandle);
if(DomainController != NULL)
NetApiBufferFree(DomainController);
return RTN_OK;
}
void
InitLsaString(
PLSA_UNICODE_STRING LsaString,
LPWSTR String
)
{
DWORD StringLength;
if(String == NULL) {
LsaString->Buffer = NULL;
LsaString->Length = 0;
LsaString->MaximumLength = 0;
return;
}
StringLength = lstrlenW(String);
LsaString->Buffer = String;
LsaString->Length = (USHORT) StringLength * sizeof(WCHAR);
LsaString->MaximumLength = (USHORT) (StringLength + 1) *
sizeof(WCHAR);
}
NTSTATUS
OpenPolicy(
LPWSTR ServerName,
DWORD DesiredAccess,
PLSA_HANDLE PolicyHandle
)
{
LSA_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes;
LSA_UNICODE_STRING ServerString;
PLSA_UNICODE_STRING Server = NULL;
//
// Always initialize the object attributes to all zeroes
//
ZeroMemory(&ObjectAttributes, sizeof(ObjectAttributes));
if(ServerName != NULL) {
//
// Make a LSA_UNICODE_STRING out of the LPWSTR passed in
//
InitLsaString(&ServerString, ServerName);
Server = &ServerString;
}
//
// Attempt to open the policy
//
return LsaOpenPolicy(
Server,
&ObjectAttributes,
DesiredAccess,
PolicyHandle
);
}
/*++
This function retrieves the Sid representing the specified DomainName.
If the function succeeds, the return value is TRUE and pDomainSid will
point to the Sid representing the specified DomainName. The caller
should free the memory associated with this Sid with the Win32 API
FreeSid() when the Sid is no longer needed.
If the function fails, the return value is FALSE, and pDomainSid will
be set to NULL.
--*/
BOOL
GetDomainSid(
LPWSTR DomainName, // domain name to acquire Sid of
PSID *pDomainSid // points to allocated Sid on success
)
{
NET_API_STATUS nas;
LPWSTR DomainController;
PUSER_MODALS_INFO_2 umi2 = NULL;
DWORD dwSidSize;
BOOL bSuccess = FALSE; // assume this function will fail
*pDomainSid = NULL; // invalidate pointer
//
// obtain the PDC computer name of the supplied domain name
//
nas = NetGetDCName(NULL, DomainName, (LPBYTE *)&DomainController);
if(nas != NERR_Success) {
SetLastError(nas);
return FALSE;
}
__try {
//
// obtain the domain Sid from the PDC
// NOTE: this may fail if the credentials of the caller are not
// recognized or valid on the target computer. In this case, it
// is necessary to first establish a connection via NetUseAdd()
// at info-level 2 to the remote IPC$, specifying EMPTY
// credentials.
//
nas = NetUserModalsGet(DomainController, 2, (LPBYTE *)&umi2);
if(nas != NERR_Success) __leave;
//
// if the Sid is valid, obtain the size of the Sid
//
if(!IsValidSid(umi2->usrmod2_domain_id)) __leave;
dwSidSize = GetLengthSid(umi2->usrmod2_domain_id);
//
// allocate storage and copy the Sid
//
*pDomainSid = (PSID)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, dwSidSize);
if(*pDomainSid == NULL) __leave;
if(!CopySid(dwSidSize, *pDomainSid, umi2->usrmod2_domain_id))
__leave;
bSuccess = TRUE; // indicate success
} // try
__finally {
//
// free allocated memory
//
NetApiBufferFree(DomainController);
if(umi2 != NULL)
NetApiBufferFree(umi2);
if(!bSuccess) {
//
// if the function failed, free memory and indicate result code
//
if(*pDomainSid != NULL) {
FreeSid(*pDomainSid);
*pDomainSid = NULL;
}
if(nas != NERR_Success) {
SetLastError(nas);
}
}
}
return bSuccess;
}
/*++
This function manipulates the trust associated with the supplied
DomainSid.
If the domain trust does not exist, it is created with the
specified password. In this case, the supplied PolicyHandle must
have been opened with POLICY_TRUST_ADMIN and POLICY_CREATE_SECRET
access to the policy object.
If the domain trust exists, the password is updated with the
password specified by the Password parameter. The trust OldPassword
is set to the previous password.
If DomainName and Password are NULL, the trusted domain specified by
DomainSid is deleted.
--*/
NTSTATUS
SetTrustedDomainInfo(
LSA_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
PSID DomainSid, // Sid of domain to manipulate
LPWSTR TrustedDomainName, // trusted domain name to add/update
LPWSTR Password // new trust password for trusted domain
)
{
PTRUSTED_PASSWORD_INFO tpi;
PTRUSTED_DOMAIN_NAME_INFO tdni;
LSA_UNICODE_STRING LsaPassword;
TRUSTED_PASSWORD_INFO Newtpi;
BOOL bTrustExists = TRUE; // assume trust exists
NTSTATUS Status;
//
// Make sure you were passed a valid Sid
//
if(DomainSid == NULL || !IsValidSid(DomainSid))
return STATUS_INVALID_SID;
//
// if TrustedDomainName and Password is NULL (or empty strings),
// delete the specified trust
//
if( (TrustedDomainName == NULL || *TrustedDomainName == L'\0') &&
(Password == NULL || *Password == L'\0') ) {
return LsaDeleteTrustedDomain(PolicyHandle, DomainSid);
}
//
// query the current password, which is used to update the
// OldPassword. If the trust doesn't exist, indicate this so that
// the trust will be created.
//
Status = LsaQueryTrustedDomainInfo(
PolicyHandle,
DomainSid,
TrustedPasswordInformation,
&tpi);
if(Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
if(Status == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND) {
bTrustExists = FALSE; // indicate trust does not exist
}
else {
DisplayNtStatus("LsaQueryTrustedDomainInfo", Status);
return Status;
}
}
InitLsaString(&LsaPassword, Password);
//
// set the new password to the supplied password
//
Newtpi.Password = LsaPassword;
if(bTrustExists) {
//
// if the trust already existed, set OldPassword to the
// current password...
//
Newtpi.OldPassword = tpi->Password;
}
else {
LSA_UNICODE_STRING LsaDomainName;
DWORD cchDomainName; // number of chars in TrustedDomainName
//
// if the trust did not exist, set OldPassword to the
// supplied password...
//
Newtpi.OldPassword = LsaPassword;
InitLsaString(&LsaDomainName, TrustedDomainName);
//
// ...convert TrustedDomainName to uppercase...
//
cchDomainName = LsaDomainName.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
while(cchDomainName--) {
LsaDomainName.Buffer[cchDomainName] =
towupper(LsaDomainName.Buffer[cchDomainName]);
}
//
// ...create the trusted domain object
//
Status = LsaSetTrustedDomainInformation(
PolicyHandle,
DomainSid,
TrustedDomainNameInformation,
&LsaDomainName
);
if(Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) return Status;
}
//
// update TrustedPasswordInformation for the specified trust
//
Status = LsaSetTrustedDomainInformation(
PolicyHandle,
DomainSid,
TrustedPasswordInformation,
&Newtpi
);
//
// if a trust already existed, free the memory associated with
// the retrieved information
//
if(bTrustExists) LsaFreeMemory(tpi);
return Status;
}
/*++
This function verifies that the "permitted to trust" side of the
trust relationship has been established and that the specified
password matches the "permitted to trust" password.
If the function fails, the return value is FALSE, and bTrustVerified
is undefined.
If the function succeeds, the trust verification succeeded, and
bTrustVerified is set to the result of the verification.
If bTrustVerified is TRUE, the trust relationship is verified.
If bTrustVerified is FALSE, the trust was not verified. Call
GetLastError() to get extended error information.
ERROR_NO_SUCH_USER indicates that the "permitted to trust"
UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT does not exist on the specified domain.
ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE indicates that the supplied password does
not match the password in the "permitted to trust"
UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT.
NOTE: if a connection exists to the domain controller of the
TargetDomainName prior to calling this function, this function will
fail due to a credential conflict (WinError == 1219).
--*/
BOOL
VerifyTrustRelationship(
LPWSTR TargetDomainName, // domain name to verify trust at
LPWSTR TrustAccountToVerify, // trusted domain name to verify
LPWSTR Password, // password associated with trust
LPBOOL bTrustVerified // indicates if trust was verified
)
{
NET_API_STATUS nas;
USE_INFO_2 ui2;
LPWSTR DomainController;
LPWSTR szIpc = L"\\IPC$";
LPWSTR RemoteResource = NULL;
LPWSTR UserName = NULL;
BOOL bSuccess = FALSE; // assume this function will fail
//
// fetch the computer name of the domain you try to connect to
//
nas = NetGetDCName(
NULL, TargetDomainName, (LPBYTE *)&DomainController);
if(nas != NERR_Success) {
SetLastError(nas);
return FALSE;
}
__try {
//
// build the \\<DCName>\ipc$ as the remote resource
//
RemoteResource = (LPWSTR)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0,
(lstrlenW(DomainController) + lstrlenW(szIpc) + 1 ) *
sizeof(WCHAR)
);
if(RemoteResource == NULL) __leave;
if(lstrcpyW(RemoteResource, DomainController) == NULL) __leave;
if(lstrcatW(RemoteResource, szIpc) == NULL) __leave;
//
// build the user name as <TrustAccountToVerify>$
//
UserName = (LPWSTR)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0,
(lstrlenW(TrustAccountToVerify) + 1 + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR)
);
if(UserName == NULL) __leave;
if(lstrcpyW(UserName, TrustAccountToVerify) == NULL) __leave;
if(lstrcatW(UserName, L"$") == NULL) __leave;
ZeroMemory(&ui2, sizeof(ui2));
ui2.ui2_local = NULL;
ui2.ui2_remote = RemoteResource;
ui2.ui2_asg_type = USE_IPC;
ui2.ui2_password = Password;
ui2.ui2_username = UserName;
ui2.ui2_domainname = TargetDomainName;
//
// Attempt to establish a connection to the target domain.
// If the result is ERROR_NOLOGON_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT,
// this illustrates the supplied Password matches an existing
// trust account because the credentials were validated but
// a logon is not allowed for this account type.
//
nas = NetUseAdd(NULL, 2, (LPBYTE)&ui2, NULL);
if(nas == ERROR_NOLOGON_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
*bTrustVerified = TRUE; // indicate trust verified
}
else {
*bTrustVerified = FALSE; // indicate trust not verified
//
// if the connection succeeded, the UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT
// does not exist, because the supplied credentials aren't
// recognized by the remote (default credentials are applied).
// Delete the connection and indicate the "permitted to trust"
// account is non-existent.
//
if(nas == NERR_Success) {
NetUseDel(NULL, RemoteResource, 0);
nas = ERROR_NO_SUCH_USER;
}
}
bSuccess = TRUE; // indicate this function succeeded
} // try
__finally {
//
// free allocated memory
//
NetApiBufferFree(DomainController);
if(RemoteResource != NULL) {
HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, RemoteResource);
}
if(UserName != NULL) {
HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, UserName);
}
//
// if you succeeded, but trust could not be verified, indicate why
//
if(bSuccess == TRUE && *bTrustVerified == FALSE) {
SetLastError(nas);
}
}
return bSuccess;
}
void
DisplayNtStatus(
LPSTR szAPI, // ANSI string containing API name
NTSTATUS Status
)
{
//
// convert the NTSTATUS to Winerror and display the result
//
DisplayError(szAPI, LsaNtStatusToWinError(Status));
}
void
DisplayError(
LPSTR szAPI, // pointer to failed API name
DWORD dwLastError
)
{
LPSTR MessageBuffer;
DWORD dwBufferLength;
fprintf(stderr,"%s error! (rc=%lu)\n", szAPI, dwLastError);
if(dwBufferLength=FormatMessageA(
FORMAT_MESSAGE_ALLOCATE_BUFFER |
FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM,
NULL,
dwLastError,
GetUserDefaultLangID(),
(LPSTR) &MessageBuffer,
0,
NULL
))
{
DWORD dwBytesWritten;
//
// Output message string on stderr
//
WriteFile(
GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE),
MessageBuffer,
dwBufferLength,
&dwBytesWritten,
NULL
);
//
// free the buffer allocated by the system
//
LocalFree(MessageBuffer);
}
}