Inter-Domain Trust Account Passwords (128489)


The information in this article applies to:

  • Microsoft Windows NT Server 3.5
  • Microsoft Windows NT Server 3.51
  • Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0
  • Microsoft Windows NT Workstation 3.5
  • Microsoft Windows NT Workstation 3.51
  • Microsoft Windows NT Workstation 4.0
This article was previously published under Q128489

SUMMARY

Trust relationships may be established between domains so that they may share user account information. A secure channel is established between a domain controller (DC) in the trusting domain and a domain controller in the trusted domain. The secure channel ensures that only servers with the proper access rights can send and receive privileged information. Primarily, the trusting DC uses the secure channel to pass validation requests to the trusted domain controller.

This article contains information on the accounts used to create and maintain the secure channel.

MORE INFORMATION

The accounts and procedures used in a trusted domain relationship are discussed in this article. Similar accounts and procedures are used in the trust relationship between a primary domain controller (PDC) and a backup domain controller (BDC), and between a Windows NT DC and a Windows NT Workstation in the domain.

For simplicity, the trusted domain is referred to as MASTER and the trusting domain is referred to as RESOURCE. The trusted domain, MASTER, contains the user account information. RESOURCE is the trusting domain; it trusts MASTER to validate user access to its resources.

On each Domain Controller in RESOURCE, the existence of the trust is represented by an LSA trusted domain object. It contains the name of the trusted domain and the domain security ID (SID). The LSA trusted domain object is replicated from the trusting domain PDC to each of the BDCs in the trusting domain.

On each DC in RESOURCE, a password is stored in an LSA secret object G$$<TrustedDomainName> (for example, G$$MASTER). This object is stored in the registry key HKEY_Local_Machine\Security\Policy\Secrets. The LSA secret object for the trusted domain trust relationship is replicated from the trusting domain PDC to each of the trusting domain BDCs.

On each DC in MASTER, the password is stored in a SAM user account marked as INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT (for example, RESOURCE$). This can be viewed in the registry path \SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE subtree). This account is replicated from the trusted domain PDC to each of the trusted domain BDCs.

These accounts are created when a trust is initially established. The administrator of the trusted domain, MASTER, uses User Manager to permit RESOURCE to trust MASTER's accounts. When the domain is added in the Permit to Trust dialog, a password is provided by the administrator. At this time, a hidden user account is created in the SAM for the trusting domain. The account contains the specified password (for example, RESOURCE$).

The administrator of the trusting domain then establishes the trust. The administrator provides the password specified earlier. User Manager creates the LSA secret object. The server in RESOURCE attempts to setup a session with the DC in MASTER using the account RESOURCE$. The DC controller in MASTER responds with the error "0xc0000198, Status_Nologon_Interdomain_ Trust_Account" because the special Inter-Domain Trust Account cannot be used in a normal session logon. The session request fails because of this condition.

This error is informative to the DC in the RESOURCE domain. Receiving this error indicates that the trust account exists and a trust is possible. Upon receiving that response, it establishes a null session and then uses RPC transactions to use remote API calls that establish the trusted domain relationship. A secure channel is set up later by the netlogon service in the trust domain using the trust information that was stored by the user manager.

After the trust is established, the RESOURCE PDC changes the trusted domain object password. The procedure for this is detailed below. All DCs in each domain receive the trust account objects through normal intra-domain synchronization of the SAM and the LSA databases. The DCs in RESOURCE receive the LSA secret object during the update of the LSA database, and the DCs in MASTER receive the account in the SAM update. With these objects, any DC in the trusting domain can set up a secure channel to any DC in the trusted domain.

Maintenance of these accounts consists of periodic password changes. Every seven days the PDC of the trusting domain changes the password of the trusted domain object. It does this by:

  1. Picking a new password.
  2. Setting the OldPassword field of the LSA secret object to the previous NewPassword field.
  3. Setting the NewPassword field to the LSA secret object to the password picked in step 1. This allows the DCs to always have a password around that works in the event of a crash.
  4. Remoting an I_NetServerPasswordSet RPC call to a DC of the trusted domain asking it to set the password on the SAM user trust account to the value picked in step 1. The trusting PDC remotes the RPC call to whatever trusted DC it has the secure channel with. That machine passes the request through to the trusted PDC.
The password is now changed on both PDCs. Normal replication distributes the objects to the BDCs.

A domain controller of the trusted domain (MASTER) never initiates the password change; it is always initiated by the trusting domain PDC.

It is possible, but not likely, that the trusting domain DC will change the password without updating a DC in the trusted domain. Initiating the password change requires that the secure channel has been set up. It is remotely possible that the trusted side my have gone down at some point during the process and not received the updated password. For this reason, both the old and new passwords are kept in the LSA Secret object on the trusting side. Additionally, the PDC in the trusting domain never changes the new password unless it has successfully authenticated (set up a secure channel) using the current new password.

If authentication fails using the new password because the password is invalid, the trusting PDC tries the old password. If it authenticates successfully with the old password, it immediately (within 15 minutes) continues the password change algorithm with step 4 (above). It does not start over with step 1 because that might lead to problems where role changes have occurred.
Modification Type:MajorLast Reviewed:5/6/2003
Keywords:kbnetwork KB128489
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