------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Prev][Next][Index] 9 February Prism - Part 4 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- * To: Multiple recipients of list * Subject: 9 February Prism - Part 4 * From: Broadcast * Date: Sat, 10 Feb 1996 11:58:25 -0500 * From jf-monitor@sura.net Sat Feb 10 11: 58:49 1996 * Reply-To: jf-monitor@sura.net * Sender: jf-monitor@sura.net ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- [ From: Broadcast * EMC.Ver #2.5.02 ] -- THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION PRISM A BI-WEEKLY ON THE POST-SOVIET STATES PART 4 ____________________________________________ GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS by Andrei Zhukov Elections of local administration heads were held in 13 regions of the Russian Federation simultaneously with the State Duma elections. Interestingly, in the early fall of 1995 more than 30 Federation subjects addressed the president requesting that he order the election of the head of the executive in their domains. In allowing elections, the president chose those republics, territories and regions where he was sure the incumbent governors would win. Boris Nemtsov, the Nizhni Novgorod governor is perhaps the most well-known regional governor in Russia. Almost from the date of his appointment (November 30, 1991) he has argued that gubernatorial elections should be held in his region. Recently the elections were held. Nemtsov's major rival was Vyacheslav Rasteryaev, president of the "Nizhegorodsky Dom" joint-stock company (the latter company specializes in building luxurious housing in the city). Strange as it may seem, businessman Rasteryaev was supported by the local Communists. Having taken a leave of absence, Boris Nemtsov made a trip around the region spending nearly 300 hours conferring with the people. After the trip Boris Nemtsov completed the drafting of his election program. In fact, it boiled down to continuing the former course of reforms. The only novelty was perhaps the declaration of intent to introduce a tax "On Wealth. " In the meantime, his opponents attacked the "course of reforms by Nemtsov. " Nevertheless, Boris Nemtsov received 57.78 percent of the votes and hence won the elections in the first round. Four persons claimed the post of Belgorod region administration head: incumbent governor Yevgeny Savchenko, Federation Council Deputy Mikhail Beskhmelnitsyn, State Duma Deputy Sergei Sarychev (he was supported by the LDPR), and State Duma Deputy (independent deputy) and head of the regional migration service Vladimir Naboka. Local analysts predicted victory for the incumbent governor whose campaign was well organized and, in the end, 60 percent of the votes were cast in favor of Savchenko. Even in the Primorsky region, the incumbent governor Yevgeny Nazdratenko, who is notorious for his authoritarian behavior, was victorious. The only exception to the tendency for incumbents to emerge victorious in the gubernatorial elections were the elections in the Tambov and Novosibirsk oblasts where the incumbents were defeated and the victory went to Communists (Aleksandr Ryabov and Vitaly Mukha respectively). It appears that the majority of the incumbent governors have good chances to be re-elected. Not because they are loved or supported by the people but just because their potential rivals are completely obscure. It is virtually impossible to make an obscure figure popular in a brief period of several months, especially since the incumbents are firmly in control of the regional mass media. Among the elected governors only Boris Nemtsov, Nizhni Novgorod governor, can be positively characterized as a democracy-oriented reformer; Nemtsov is known to sympathize with Yabloko. As far as the others are concerned their political sympathies are not so clearly seen. This is fairly understandable: They have on the one hand to listen to what their voters say, while on the other hand they must abide by the president's will. The question is what these governors actually want. Economics As far as this sphere is concerned, almost all the gubernatorial candidates have promised to try hard to beat funds out of the federal budget. For example, Primorsky governor Yevgeny Nazdratenko, visited Moscow in January in order to raise more subsidies from the center. Plans specifically call for adopting a new conception for developing the Primorsky territory in the light of Russia's geostrategic and economic interests in Asia. Even the democratically-oriented Nizhni Novgorod governor had once noted: "My appraisal of the performance of the deputies elected to the State Duma from the Nizhni Novgorod region will be based not on political statements or declarations they make but on the amount of money allocated to the region from the federal budget." In addition to that, the Federation subjects will obviously continue fighting for stable (fixed) rates of deductions from the federal taxes and incomes to the budgets of Federation subjects. For example, they seek to enjoy 50 percent of the money collected as excises on alcohol, vodka and alcoholic beverages, 100 percent of the money collected as excises on certain other items, etc. Furthermore, the regions have sought to acquire the right to introduce regional and local taxes, however, limited respectively to 2 percent and 5 percent of the total of the payroll fund. Another urgent question is the one about financial assistance to the regions in the form of transfer payments. The Federation subjects are currently seeking that the fund for financial support of the regions (which is currently established at 15 percent of the total of the federal tax income) be increased. Relations With the Center The constitutions of many republics of the Russian Federation as well the statutes (or rules) of many territories and regions contain provisions which contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation. For example, Article 65 of the Constitution of the Komi Republic reads: "Laws of the Komi Republic, adopted within the limits of the republican sphere of competence, have superiority on the territory of the Komi Republic and are mandatory for all legal entities and individuals." The Constitution of Tatarstan is even bolder. It declares supremacy of republican laws while saying nothing about how the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws are applied on the territory of Tatarstan. The constitutions of a number of republics (Yakutia, Ingushetia) contain a provision determining that federal laws must be ratified by the republican legislative bodies. Here it is apt to recall that the Constitution of the Russian Federation establishes that the Basic Law and federal laws have supremacy over the entire territory of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, the constitutions (or statutes) of certain Federation subjects contain a provision determining that federal laws can be suspended on their territories. For example, the Constitution of Tuva reads that only the republican constitution is effective in the republic in periods of emergency or political or state crises. This creates a possibility of the federal constitution being suspended in the republic. It is precisely this way that has been assumed by the newly elected governors. According to information at our disposal, draft division of power treaties (treaties on division of powers and spheres of competence between the center and the federation subject) are currently being prepared by the authorities of Chechnya, the Primorsky territory and the Novosibirsk oblast, Moscow oblast and a number of other regions; in addition, the regions are drafting their statutes many of which are not completely in line with the Russian Constitution. Such "violations," which give more powers and opportunities to regional administrations, appear to be very attractive for the governors. Local Self-Government and Separation of Powers As far as the separation of powers is concerned the governors are on the one hand seeking to enjoy a relative independence from the center (specifically, in property disbursement, use of funds received from the federal budget, etc.) while on the other hand they are seeking to exercise control over their legislatures. For example, the statutes of the Novgorod and Orenburg oblasts and Stavropol territory allow the governors to sign agreements or treaties (on behalf of the region or territory) without submitting them to their legislative assemblies for ratification. Moreover, many governors intentionally obstruct the development of local self-government in their regions (or territories) because they see a threat to their personal power in this process. In a number of regions (specifically in the Tambov oblast ) no local self-government bodies have yet been established. A curious situation has developed in the Novosibirsk oblast. The city of Novosibirsk, which is a financial donor for the whole region, seeks to have its budget separated from that of the regional budget . The victory of Vitaly Mukha in the gubernatorial elections in this region was an unpleasant surprise for the city administration (they supported former governor Ivan Indink). Therefore, the city authorities seek to obtain the maximum possible economic independence from the region. The approaching mayoral elections in the city may only serve to heat up these "splitting" passions; the idea of "autonomization" will probably become the key issue in the upcoming election campaign. A graphic manifestation of this policy: municipally owned enterprises are often transferred to the property of the executive branch (examples can be found in the Krasnodar territory, Bryansk region and a number of other Federation subjects). Army In early December Russian interior minister Anatoly Kulikov addressed the Stavropol territorial administration with a request for help for the 54th Division of the Interior Troops which is deployed in the territory. As of this moment, the request is being considered by the Stavropol regional administration head Petr Marchenko. In all likelihood the request will be honored. However, as a matter of fact this means that the governor is seeking to court the military (in this case the Interior Troops), i.e., to win their love and support. Interestingly, this situation is equally characteristic of "democratic" Nizhni Novgorod and the pro-Communist Kemerovo region. It is quite possible that if an emergency situation occurs these military units will betray their commanders in favor of the territorial administration. Apparently, the process we are witnessing today is that of the Russian Federation entering a new stage of "regionalization." This is not a "parade of sovereignties" like that of 1992 when many regions raised the possibility of seceding from the Russian Federation. Regional elites do not raise the question of seceding from the Russian Federation today; instead they are seeking to bargain maximum powers from the center. Pursuing this goal they either seek that a division-of-powers treaty be signed or a federal targeted program providing for assistance to the region be adopted. The time is right for such activities today. The removal of Anatoly Chubais and a number of other key figures from the government has been perceived by the regional elites as signaling a change of economic course but it is also indicative of the president seeking to win the regions over to his side with an eye to the upcoming presidential elections. It is not a secret that the federal authorities have ways to exert pressure on the governors. Fresh in the minds of everyone is Chernomyrdin's recent statement that the "center" will seek to remove [fire] those governors who failed to adequately back "Russia Is Our Home" in the parliamentary elections. In exchange for their loyalty the governors can be rewarded with additional powers and funds from the center. But increasing budget subsidies and signing division-of-powers treaties actually helps regional elites to become more independent of the center. Translated by Aleksandr Kondorsky. Andrei Zhukov works for the Global Press Syndicate. ____________________________________________________________ Prism is a publication of the Jamestown Foundation. We welcome your comments, suggestions, and any questions you may have. Please contact us by e-mail at Long@jamestown.org, by fax at 202-483-8337, or by postal mail at The Jamestown Foundation, 1528 18th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036. Copyright (c) 1996 The Jamestown Foundation. 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