------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Prev][Next][Index] 9 February Prism - Part 2 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- * To: Multiple recipients of list * Subject: 9 February Prism - Part 2 * From: Broadcast * Date: Sat, 10 Feb 1996 11:21:01 -0500 * From jf-monitor@sura.net Sat Feb 10 11: 21:29 1996 * Reply-To: jf-monitor@sura.net * Sender: jf-monitor@sura.net ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- [ From: Broadcast * EMC.Ver #2.5.02 ] -- THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION PRISM A BI-WEEKLY ON THE POST-SOVIET STATES PART 2 ____________________________________________ FUTURE CHANGES IN RUSSIAN MILITARY POLICY by Stanislav Lunev Dramatic changes have taken place in the Moscow leadership. Andrei Kozyrev has been replaced as Russia's minister of foreign affairs by the significantly tougher politician Yevgeny Primakov, a former highly-placed party functionary and, in recent years -- the director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the successor of the former KGB's First Main Directorate. Appointed as director of the USSR's SVR in the fall of 1991 by former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, Yevgeny Primakov was confirmed in his post in December of that year by Russian president Boris Yeltsin, and has "outlived" the directors of the other Russian special services, who were changed every few months. While he was the leader of Russian political intelligence, Yevgeny Primakov only rarely permitted himself to make public speeches, and he could be seen on the screen of Russian television, for the most part, only during sessions of the Russian Security Council, when, no matter how hard he tried, he could not hide from reporters' cameras. But, on the day after his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, he held his first press conference, in the course of which he briefly sketched out his vision of the main directions of future Russian foreign policy. In particular, underlining press speculation about his views on Russian foreign policy towards the West and relations with the North Atlantic alliance, Yevgeny Primakov said that he had a "negative" attitude towards the expansion of NATO, which, in his words, would be counterproductive for the stabilization of the situation in Europe and, undoubtedly, would lead to the creation of a "new geopolitical situation for Russia."(1) After noting his intention to defend Russia's national interests, corresponding to her position as a "great power," the new minister emphasized that his policy would not harm the development of Russian relations with the U.S., and that he would not like to be declared a "persona non grata" in the U.S. Neither confirming nor denying reports that he was an advocate of the restoration of the former USSR, the new leader of Russia's foreign policy noted that "the question of the restoration of the Soviet Union" was "not on the agenda at the present time." But after that, Yevgeny Primakov said directly that the main priorities of current and future Russian policy ought to be the reinforcement of ties with the other former Soviet republics, and also with such countries as China, Japan, and the countries of the Middle East. By saying this, the new minister confirmed hints, which have been circulating in the Russian and foreign press, that there would be a fundamental shift in the main direction of Russian foreign policy, which would be reoriented from the development of close relations with the West towards the formation of more steadfast ties with the East, including the creation of new political, and possibly, military-organizational structures in Asia, which could balance the recent development of Russian ties with the leading Western democracies, which have not been completely satisfactory for Russia. A sense of dissatisfaction in Russian military and political circles with the West, and a feeling that Russia has become dependent on the West, has become increasingly significant. In this respect, the opinion of specialists in the Moscow Institute of Defense Research (IOI), which works for the Defense Ministry, the Armed Forces General Staff, and the Russian special services, could be important. In the opinion of IOI experts, Western policy towards NATO's future was a direct attempt to isolate Russia and "squeeze" her out of Europe.(2) The eastward expansion of the NATO bloc was deemed inevitable and was said to be planned to take place in several stages. In the first stage, in the course of two to three years, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary would be incorporated into NATO. During the second stage, according to the report, near the year 2000, NATO plans to incorporate Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria, as well as Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. Finland and Austria would also be included in NATO in this stage. Moreover, these specialists in military policy think that in the third stage of NATO's expansion, which will last until 2005, the entry of Ukraine into the North Atlantic alliance cannot be excluded, but Russia would not be let in "under any circumstances." The main initiator of NATO's eastward expansion was said to be Germany, which purportedly made the final decision on this after the completion of the withdrawal of Russian troops from that country in August 1994. In this sense, according to the experts, it is possible to speak of the resurgence of German expansionism towards the east and south-east, which, already twice in this century, has sparked the fire of world war and which has become possible at the present time under the cover of the American "nuclear umbrella." The IOI experts declared the U.S. to be the other initiator of NATO's eastward expansion, and emphasized that, in the opinion of a significant number of influential representatives of the American elite, such a turn of events would make it possible for the U.S. to consolidate its leading position on the European continent, and help compensate for American economic weakness in the region before the European Union, headed by Germany . In addition, it was indicated that Russia's policy of "unilateral disarmament," which "undermined the world's strategic security," should be re-examined, including with respect to the START-II and the 1972 ABM treaties, signed by the Russian side, which "burden Russia and put her in a disadvantageous position." The IOI specialists said that assurances of Western politicians that NATO's expansion would not harm Russia's national security should not be trusted, noting that just two years before, when the future of that military- political alliance was undetermined, Russia had been assured that NATO had no intention of expanding, and accepting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as new members. But today, people are already discussing proposals for deploying nuclear weapons in the Czech Republic and in Poland, operation plans exist for throwing NATO mobile forces into the Baltic states in the event of a conflict with Russia, and the idea of creating a 60,000 man "Baltic corps" of Polish, Danish, and German troops is being discussed. The specialists let it be understood that, if the geopolitical and strategic situation on the European continent changed, that Russia should look for new partners and, possibly, allies, in cooperation with whom, the Russian side could withstand Western expansion to the east and south-east. That the proposals and conclusions of the IOI specialists were not the fruit of their imagination alone, and in many respects, correspond to the views of Russia's highest military and political leadership, was unexpectedly confirmed by Russian defense minister Pavel Grachev himself, who incautiously said that if NATO expanded, the Russian side would be forced to look for new "military partners."(3) It was not hard, after Yevgeny Primakov's press conference, to name these partners, and "Russia's great eastern neighbor"--China--ought to be placed first among them. Continuing to demonstrate to the whole world the possibility of "Chinese-style real socialism" under the totalitarian leadership of the Chinese Communist party, this country, for many years, has impressed the Kremlin leaders with its ability to foster economic development, and to increase the prosperity of its population. In the political sphere, there are none of the serious contradictions or ideological disagreements which characterized Soviet-Chinese relations from the sixties to the eighties, and the disputed border questions, which were taken off the agenda back in 1991, are being solved without substantial problems. Economic ties between the two neighbors are strong as never before and are developing in a stable manner, the shelves of Russian stores are filled with Chinese staples [prodovol'stvennie tovary] and industrial goods, and trains full of high-quality Russian raw materials cross the Chinese border every day, carrying the burden of Chinese industry and increasing its competitiveness on the world market. Beginning in 1992, military ties between Russia and China also began to develop, characterized by extremely active military exchanges on the highest level, and cooperation between the two countries in the development and production of the most modern weapons systems. The Russo-Chinese Intergovernmental Commission on Military and Technical Cooperation, whose fourth session completed its work successfully last December in Moscow, is working quite well, under the leadership of First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets and Deputy Chairman of the Chinese Central Military Council, Col. Gen. Liu Huatsin.(4) On the basis of introducing identical and similar weapons systems, the weapons integration of the Russian armed forces and the Chinese People's Liberation Army is taking place, and the real preconditions are being created for making interchangeable weapons and ammunition. Moreover, cooperation between Russia and China is expanding in the area of intelligence, which is creating serious preconditions for forming a climate of mutual trust in Russo-Chinese relations, even in the sphere of guaranteeing the two countries' national security. An agreement on such cooperation, by the way, was signed in Beijing at the end of the summer of 1992, by the present Russian minister of foreign affairs. It envisaged the restoration of the cooperation in the area of intelligence which had been cut off in 1959. According to a Washington Times report, this secret treaty covered the activities of Russian Military Strategic Intelligence (GRU) and the Foreign Intelligence Service, which are cooperating with the Chinese People's Liberation Army's Military Intelligence Directorate.(5) In connection with this agreement, the report noted the "anxiety of unnamed American officials over the fact that this cooperation will be directed towards coordinating Russia's and China's efforts in conducting intelligence activities against the U.S. and other Western countries, first of all, in the collection of information about modern advanced technologies." Naming Japan as the second in the list of countries with which Russia ought to develop priority relations, Yevgeny Primakov, as befits a long-time head of an intelligence agency, dissembled a little at his January 12 press conference. And this is because the possible development of the whole complex of Russo-Japanese ties is based on the resolution of an as yet unresolved question of real principle, that of the so-called "Northern Territories," or the four islands of the Kurile chain--Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, and Habomai--whose return the Japanese government has been demanding for half a century. The complexity of this problem, linked with the territorial integrity of both Russia and Japan, is holding up the improvement of ties between Tokyo and Moscow, and, undoubtedly, will complicate any steps towards a possible political rapprochement between the two countries. But the new Russian minister's statement of the need to develop Russia's relations with Asian countries corresponds completely to reality. The preservation of close Russian political, economic, and military ties with such countries as North Korea, Vietnam, and India, needs no explanation. And new Russian arms supplies to these states, including the most modern weapons systems, (surface-to-air missile complexes for the North Korean and other armies, for example) forces one to think about the real possibility that, if not alliances, then cooperation in the military sphere, between Russia and these countries, could be developed and expressed in the form of pacts and bilateral alliances. As regards the Middle Eastern countries of that continent, Iran's priority cannot be doubted. Close and friendly relations were established long ago between Tehran and Moscow, characterized in the political plane, by the cooperation of the two countries in their efforts to deny the West access to the oil wealth of the Caspian Sea basin and by the political and economic strangling of all the attempts of Azerbaijan, the only Muslim former union republic which has refused to knuckle under to Moscow, to get a direct outlet to the Western market for its oil. Russia's shipments of the most modern weapons systems to Iran, her granting Iran access to nuclear technology, which is quite dubious from the standpoint of international security--this is far from being a complete list of the questions of Russian -Iranian bilateral relations. In this respect, it is also worth examining future Russian-Iraqi cooperation, in light of the constant Russian calls for lifting the UN trade embargo against Baghdad, which would enable Iraq to pay its multi-billion dollar debt to Moscow. What Soviet-Iraqi military cooperation in the 1980s led to is well-known to everyone, as well as the fact that its initiator and builder is now Russia's minister of foreign affairs, who, exactly five years ago, in the capacity of the Soviet president's special envoy, demonstrated his friendly relations with Saddam Hussein before the television cameras during his visit to Baghdad just before the beginning of Operation Desert Storm. Proceeding from the existing geopolitical and strategic situation on the Asian continent, it is difficult to suppose that a multilateral military structure could arise in that region which would be able to withstand the West as a whole, and NATO in particular. But, already at the present time, the preconditions exist for the emergence in the near future of bilateral military-political pacts and alliances, whose participants, out of calculations of their own, and in part, mutual interest, will strive for closer cooperation in the military area, and the architect of their creation will be the present Russian Federation. What these coming unions will be like--time will tell, but the process of their creation will be defined not only by the sides participating in them, but also by the leading Western democracies, on whose reaction to this, the very future of the West, in many ways, could depend. One event which happened at the same time as Yevgeny Primakov's appointment , can also bear witness to the possibility of serious shifts in Russian policy, above all, in military policy. By presidential order, on January 10, Yevgeny Primakov's first deputy, Col. Gen. Vyacheslav Trubnikov, a professional intelligence officer, who previously served in the KGB and headed the Asian section of Russian political intelligence, was appointed director of the SVR. That is, a man who has made a substantial contribution to the development of Russian relations with Asian countries, including the restoration of cooperation between the Russian and Chinese special services, and with those other states on that continent. Such cooperation is directed both towards strengthening the Russian position in those countries and at creation of the preconditions for future resistance [protivodeistvie] to the West. In this regard, his statement last year, that Russia can look on the West and NATO as enemies, could be significant.(6) At the 75-year anniversary ceremony of the formation of the VChK-KGB-SVR--triumphantly celebrated in a country which had long before proclaimed itself to be a new "democratic state," Vyacheslav Trubnikov, as befits a Chekist general, said directly that if the North Atlantic alliance cannot find a way to "transform itself and adapt to the post-Cold War era's new political realities," then, of course, NATO would remain a "hostile" alliance, from the Russian point of view. NOTES: 1. The Washington Post, January 13, 1995 2. Sovetskaya Rossiya, October 26, 1995 3. On the "Vesti" program on Russian television, November 2, 1995 4. Itar-Tass, December 8, 1995 5. The Washington Times, October 21, 1992 6. The Washington Times, January 11, 1995 Translated by Mark Eckert Stanislav Lunev is a former colonel in Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). __________________________________________________________________ A NEW CAUCASIAN WAR: MYTH OR REALITY by Igor Rotar The recent incident in which Chechen terrorists took hostages in the Dagestani city of Kizlyar and the tragic events that followed in the settlement of Pervomaiskoye have resulted in a dramatic exacerbation of the situation in the Caucasus. Never before since the beginning of the Chechen war has the probability of this war developing from a "local" conflict into a Caucasian-wide one been so high. Surprising Calm Immediately after the introduction of Russian troops in Chechnya many well- known political experts forecast that the war would inevitably spread into the neighboring republic of Dagestan. There is probably no other country in the world where so many ethnic groups live together (sometimes being immediate neighbors) on such a small territory. According to official data, Dagestan is populated by representatives of approximately 30 ethnic groups. As a matter of fact, the actual number is much greater. It is a common occurrence in Dagestan for people of two immediately neighboring settlements to speak different languages and represent separate nations. Peace in Dagestan is based on a fragile ethnic balance, therefore, any unrest at any given site of the republic is fraught with the danger of starting a "chain reaction." In this particular case, the situation is further aggravated by the fact that approximately 70,000 of the native residents of the Khasavyurt region are ethnic Chechens and many Chechen refugees have been streaming precisely into the Khasavyurt region. Significantly, not only the republican authorities who can be accused of being dependent on Moscow but also ordinary residents of the North Caucasian republics were rather restrained in reacting to Russia's intervention in Chechnya. Rallies of Muslim solidarity with the Chechen people could gather no more than 2,000 participants: The official clergy and even leaders of the radical Dagestani Islamic Party did not make any harsh statements concerning Russia's intervention in Chechnya. Unlike Chechnya which is rich in oil, Dagestan is very poor. Subsidies from the center have traditionally constituted more than 90 percent of the republican budget. "Without Russia we would simply die of starvation," this was the key note of all the conversations I had with people in Dagestan. A Knot of Problems One who planned to "explode Dagestan" could hardly find a better "point of attack" than the Khasavyurt district where the settlement of Pervomaiskoye is located. Since ancient times Chechens-Akin have lived in the district. In 1944 local Chechens were forcefully deported from their lands to Kazakhstan. The lands and homes which had become uninhabited in one night were then given to the Laks, Avars and Kumyks. Under conditions of Communist rule, open conflict between the Chechens and representatives of other Dagestani nations was impossible but in the early 1990s, bloody clashes erupted in the Khasavyurt district between the local Chechens and the Avars and Laks. These clashes were put down by the federal authorities but every settlement of the district has its own armed self-defense squad today. Naturally, given this situation, the Russian leadership should have tried to refrain from unleashing any military actions in this area. Nevertheless, in violation of all considerations of common sense, a site located near the Chechen-Dagestani border was chosen for stopping the convoy with Chechen terrorists and their hostages. Once, the way to Chechnya had been blocked, the militants had no choice but to return to the territory of Dagestan and entrench themselves in the settlement of Pervomaiskoye. Too Plain a Provocation During the first few days after the Chechens seized hostages in Kizlyar calls were made at a number of rallies held in Makhachkala and other cities of Dagestan to begin pogroms against ethnic Chechens.However, the hatred towards the Chechens suddenly began to abate. "Paradoxical as it may seem," Dagestani People's Assembly Chairman's Adviser and sociologist Enver Kisrieyv comments, "It was Mr. Yeltsin who helped us. When he stated that the Chechen militants intervened in the Avars' territories and the Avars were ready to cut their throats, our people understood that they were being provoked." During the days when the Russian troops stormed Pervomaiskoye a large crowd of people, the relatives of the hostages, gathered near checkpoints located 10 kilometers from the settlement. (Dagestani police did not allow them to come nearer to the site). The people stood in silence and watched how the Russian troops eliminated the settlement where their relatives were supposedly being held. "In the beginning our hatred was directed entirely against the Chechen bandits," local people told me, "but now it turns out that not the Chechens but Russian soldiers are killing our relatives." "Our situation was extremely odd," former hostage and Kizlyar Criminal Investigation Department head Nazim Mazukayev told me, "we were fired on by our own people." The following is what a number of hostages told me: "The bandits told us: 'You see, Russia has betrayed you. They do not want anybody to escape alive out of this village.' The Chechens gave us arms and we, together with them, fought our way out through the Russian lines to escape. After that the Chechens set us free." What is most interesting is that the Russian president himself called the shameful failure of the attempt to rescue the hostages as "a successful operation." The Dagestanis had scarcely recovered from such a strange assessment of the tragedy when Yeltsin came out with another statement, alleging that Dudayev's fighters had prepared a base of support in Pervomaiskoye ahead of time. This statement of Yeltsin's caused a new outburst of anti-Russian sentiments in the republic. "If Yeltsin doesn't know what he's talking about, they shouldn't let him on the air! He's just provoking people!" Magomet Khachalayev, the leader of the Lak People's Movement said at a meeting of the representatives of Dagestan's national movements. What Lies Ahead? To all appearances, at the price of titanic efforts, this time, the Dagestani authorities have succeeded in keeping the peace in the republic. But there is no guarantee that provocateurs on both sides will not try to destabilize the situation in the republic again. Nevertheless, one must not discount the fact that today, Dudayev's fighters are split; in essence, there is simply no unified command of the Chechen resistance forces. Even if Dudayev's government makes a decision not to launch terrorist attacks in a neighboring republic, there is no guarantee that individual field commanders will agree to this. At the same time, one cannot be sure that there will be no new provocation from the opposite side. "Russian troops are opening fire on Dudayev's positions from the territory of Dagestan. Delegations have come to me several times from that side. The fighters tell me: 'We can't shoot at Dagestani villages; get the Russian troops to come out first!' I'm afraid that someday, Dudayev's fighters' patience will run out," says Basyr Dadayev , the chairman of the National Council of the Chechens of Dagestan. The mountain regions of Chechnya uncontrolled by Russian troops border on Dagestan. If the Russian troops go on the offensive, the Chechen fighters will simply be forced to retreat into the neighboring mountain regions of Dagestan. By the way, some of the fighters are based in the mountains of Dagestan even today: more than once, Dudayev's fighters have raided federal troops from the territory of the adjoining republic. The mountain region of Dagestan bordering Chechnya is settled by the Ando- Didoy peoples, related in language and culture to the Chechens, and naturally, according to the rules of mountain etiquette, the local inhabitants cannot simply refuse shelter to Dudayev's fighters when they are in trouble. It is well-known what Russian troops do to villages where Dudayev's fighters are based, and as the experience in Chechnya has shown, such methods are quite effective in filling the ranks of the fighters with what were, up until that time, peaceful inhabitants. Besides, after the introduction of Russian troops, a new source of tension arose in the region of Dagestan furthest away from the zone of military activity. About 200,000 Lezgins live in the south of the republic, and approximately the same number of these people live in the adjoining areas of Azerbaijan. After the disintegration of the USSR and the creation of the Russian-Azerbaijani border, the Lezgin national movement, "Sadaval," organized mass demonstrations demanding the creation of a single republic of Lezginstan, within the framework of the Russian Federation. At the time, the tension was defused: the Russian authorities promised to preserve freedom of movement across the borders. But after the introduction of Russian troops into Chechnya, Moscow feared that the Chechens would get aid from Azerbaijani Islamic-oriented organizations, and closed the border again. One must also not forget that the transportation of Azerbaijani oil to Western Europe is supposed to begin in the fall of 1996. If the "northern route" is chosen, the "black gold" will be transported through the territory of Lezginstan, and certain forces may try to use the means at their disposal to cut off this route. And finally, one should not discount the influence that the difficult socio -economic conditions in the republic will have on the political situation there. Decline in Production in Dagestan (as a percentage of the previous year): 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 11.7 % 27.3 % 28.3 % 43.3 % 21.0 % The standard of living here is substantially lower than in other regions of Russia. Thus, for example, in October 1995, the average [monthly] salary in Dagestan was 204,000 rubles (about $50) while the average salary in Russia is 560,000 rubles (about $125). Officially, in December 1995, unemployment in Dagestan was at 7.2 percent of the work force. In 1994, unemployment was at 5.9 percent; that is, unemployment grew by 1.3 times in one year. Dagestan has become one of 16 regions in Russia where the situation in the labor market is officially recognized to be critical. Unemployment is especially high in rural areas. In some of these areas, the unemployment rate has reached 18-20 percent of the work force. But the real number of unemployed people is still higher. There is a great deal of "hidden" unemployment in the republic: a person may work only a few hours a week, and although he is not considered to be "officially" unemployed, he receives only a symbolic salary. Naturally, in such a disastrous situation, there is great social tension, and it cannot be excluded that those who are most unfortunate could make up the backbone of Dagestan's future holy warriors. At the same time, the Dagestan scenario could also be played out in another North Caucasus republic--Ingushetia. The situation there, in many parameters , is reminiscent of that in Dagestan.The Chechens and the Ingush are virtually the same people, and call themselves by a common name--vainakhi. Until 1991, Checheno-Ingushetia was a single political unit. There is no border agreement between Chechnya and Ingushetia. There are disputed territories, to which both republics have claims. One of the sources of tension in Chechnya is the region of the village of Sernovodsk, but from the point of view of the Ingush authorities, this territory belongs to their republic. Thus, practically speaking, it is possible to say that the war has already spilled over into the territory of Ingushetia. Just as in Dagestan, federal troops are shooting at Chechen fighters from Ingush territory. There have been several cases of Ingush villages being bombed by mistake by Russian aviation. Several months ago, Russian special forces [spetsnaz] seized the Sleptsovskoye airport in Ingushetia: the military had received false information that Dudayev was there. As a result of this action, several peaceful inhabitants were wounded, and one was killed. In case of an offensive by federal troops (again, a direct analogy with Dagestan!), Dudayev's fighters will retreat into Ingush mountain villages. Thus, although this time, war has been averted in Dagestan, if there is a new provocation (and the chances for this are real), the Chechen war could grow into a North Caucasus war. And, as stated above, Dagestan is not the only potential hot spot in the Northern Caucasus into which the flames of the Chechen war could spread. Translated by Aleksandr Kondorsky and Mark Eckert Igor Rotar is a correspondent for Izvestiya. ______________________________________________ Prism is a publication of the Jamestown Foundation. We welcome your comments, suggestions, and any questions you may have. Please contact us by e-mail at Long@jamestown.org, by fax at 202-483-8337, or by postal mail at The Jamestown Foundation, 1528 18th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036. Copyright (c) 1996 The Jamestown Foundation. If you DO NOT wish to continue to receive your complimentary copy of the Prism, please send an e-mail message to: Listserv@services.sura.net In the body of the message type: SIGNOFF JF PRISM. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- * Prev: 9 February Prism - Vol.II Number 3 * Next: OMRI Daily Digest II, No. 29, 9 Feb 96 * Index: Latest Russian News -------------------------------------------------------------------------------